Dynamics of Democratization: Evidence from Municipal Suffrage Extensions
Dynamics of Democratization: Evidence from Municipal Suffrage Extensions
This paper investigates the dynamic consequences of franchise extension on future institutional change and local fiscal policy. Using a historical cross-section of Dutch municipal governments with a franchise threshold partially based on income, we exploit exogenous variation in the income threshold assigned to each municipality under the 1896 Electoral Law to identify the causal effect of suffrage expansion on subsequent voting rights and fiscal decisions. We find that while the initial enfranchisement shock persists, it does not trigger further franchise extensions over a six-year horizon, rejecting a multiplier effect of democratization. We also document a large, negative fiscal response: municipalities with a broader electorate exhibit significantly lower municipal expenditures. Decomposing expenditure categories, we find that this effect is driven entirely by reductions in governance and tax-collection costs, with no significant changes in educational spending or poor relief. These findings suggest that the economic effects of democratization can be multifaceted and depend critically on the identity of the newly enfranchised
Joint work with Bram van Besouw.